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A. No Duty to Retreat in Defense of Dwelling
Until recently, defense of dwelling and self-defense were not
clearly distinguished in Minnesota case law.1  However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided two cases in an attempt
to clarify the differences. In State v. Pendleton,2 the court held that
the two defenses diverged regarding when it is justifiable to use
deadly force. 3 To justify killing in self-defense, a person must fear
great bodily harm or death; yet deadly force is justified in
preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's home.4
Hence, the basic distinction between the two actions is that a valid
defense of dwelling claim does not require that the defendant fear
great bodily harm or death to justify use of deadly force in
preventing the commission of a felony in his or her home. Eight
months later, the court further clarified the defense of dwelling
defense in State v. Hare.6 In Hare, the court held that the defense of
one's dwelling cannot be invoked when a'Person uses deadly force
against a co-resident of the same dwelling.
More recently, the court took the opportunity to even further
1. See State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897,900 (Minn. 1999).
2. 567 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1997).
3. See State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1997) (analyzing self-
defense and the defense of dwelling as defined in Minnesota Statute section
609.065). See MINN. STAT. § 609.065 (1998) ("The intentional taking of the life of
another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or
preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or
another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony
in the actor's place of abode.").
4. See Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d at 269; see also MINN. STAT. § 609.065 (1998).
5. See Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d at 271.
6. 575 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1998).
7. See id. at 832. The court noted that a defense of dwelling claim is rooted
in the concept that "a man's home is his castle." Id. The court further stated that
when read in conjunction with Minnesota Statute section 609.065, it is "clear that
the defense of dwelling defense requires an unauthorized intrusion into the
defendant's dwelling. Necessarily, when the defendant and the victim reside in
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clarify the defense of dwelling defense. In State v. Carothers,8 the
court held that the duty to retreat does not apply to defense of
dwelling claims. In Carothers, the defendant had recently moved
into a trailer home owned by his girlfriend's mother.' He lived
there with his girlfriend, her mother, and his girlfriend's 13-year-
old brother." Shortly after defendant moved in, he and his
girlfriend hosted a card game." A man whom the defendant had
met through a neighbor brought the man's cousin to the game.13
The man the defendant had met was a member of a local gang, and
was physically large. 1 He bragged of being the "gang enforcer,"
and had a reputation in the neighborhood as a violent and ruthless
person who, when drunk, became very intimidating.15 During the
game, some persons smoked marijuana and everyone drank
16alcohol . After a few hours the game ended, and the defendant
and his girlfriend argued with the visitors over money the visitors
alleged was owed to them. 7 The visitors left, but eventually
returned. 8 At trial there was conflicting testimony as to whether
the two men knocked before reentering the trailer home.' 9 By all
accounts, one of the men angrily approached the defendant and
20the defendant shot the man six times, killing him.
The defendant was indicted for first-degree premeditated
intentional murder, second-degree intentional murder, and21
second-degree felony murder. The defendant admitted to
intentionally shooting the victim, but claimed that he acted in self-
defense and in defense of his dwelling. 2  The court instructed the
23jury on both defenses. Over defense counsel's objection, the
court instructed the jury that for both defenses the defendant had
8. 594 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1999).
9. See id. at 897-98.








18. See id. at 898-99.
19. See id.
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a duty to retreat if reasonably possible2 4 During deliberations, the
jury asked the court whether the self-defense duty to retreat
applied when acting in self-defense in one's abode.25 Again over
defense counsel's objection, the court answered that the duty to
retreat did apply if reasonably possible.26 One hour later the jury
returned a guilty verdict to second-degree felony murder.7 The
28trial court then sentenced the defendant to 165 months in jail.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
when it instructed the jury that there is a duty to retreat before
using deadly force to defend one's place of abode. 29 The court of
appeals affirmed the conviction.0 The Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.3 '
The court noted that while self-defense retreat requirements were
debated at common law, one does not have a duty to retreat while
in or defending one's dwelling. 2 While Minnesota statutes have
never addressed whether a duty to retreat applies to defense of
dwelling or self-defense claims, Minnesota courts have been fiercely
33protective of the home. The Carothers court noted that a duty to
retreat would be logically inconsistent with the holdings in







30. See id. at 899. The court of appeals held that the "duty to retreat applies
to defense of dwelling claims when the facts indicate only a defense of self within
the dwelling and the victim has already been admitted to the home." See id.
(citing State v. Carothers, 585 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)).
31. See id. at 904.
32. See id. at 900. ("The special status of the home has persisted over time,
obviating the retreat requirements for people engaging in self-defense within their
homes. 'It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own
dwelling is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground and resist
the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive
from his own home."') (quoting Gainer v. State, 391 A.2d 856, 862 (1978)). The
Hare court noted that at common law "defense of the home was considered
equivalent to defense of life itself." Hare, 575 N.W.2d at 832.
33. See Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at 900 (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 901.
These holdings are logically incompatible with a duty to retreat, which
would effectively preclude a person from preventing a felony in the
home. Mandating a duty to retreat for defense of dwelling claims will
force people to leave their homes by the back door while their family
2000] 1265
3
Fenlon: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Criminal Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
deadly force to prevent the commission of a felony in the person's35
home. To impose a duty to retreat upon such a person would be
to deny that person his right to prevent the occurrence of a felony
within his home.36
In holding that there is no duty to retreat in defense of
dwelling claims, the court also indicated a willingness to hold that
no duty to retreat attaches to cases of self-defense within the
home. While the court did not rule on the issue as it was not
properly before the court, it did note the anomaly of requiring a
duty to retreat for self-defense within the home but not requiring a
38duty to retreat in defense of one's dwelling. By requiring a person
claiming self-defense to retreat, but not requiring a person
defending his dwelling to retreat, the law seems to be providing
more protection to the person who is defending his property than
to the person who is defending his life.39  The law, however,
unequivocally values life over property.40 Therefore, the court
appears ready and willing to rule that the duty to retreat does not
attach to self-defense within one's home. The court emphasized
that the existence of a duty to retreat should not depend on the
label attached to the defense, since the line between defense of
dwelling and self-defense within the home is often blurry.4'
Finally, as the Carothers court noted, defense of dwelling and
self-defense within the dwelling do not confer a right to kill, andS 42
are to be used defensively, rather than offensively. A person who
invokes defense of dwelling must still prove that his actions were
members are exposed to danger and their houses are burgled. Further,
forcing a resident to retreat from the home is at odds with the historical
notion of the home as a place critical for the protection of the family. A
duty to retreat is incompatible with the right to prevent the commission




37. See id. at 903.
38. See id.
39. See id. (stating that since the law clearly favors life over property, a person
claiming self-defense within the home should not have a duty to retreat prior to
using deadly force).
40. See id.
41. See id. ("When events occur in a defendant's home, the factual requisite
for self-defense using deadly force-fear of great bodily harm-can often also be
expressed as the factual requisite for defense of dwelling, prevention of a felony
assault or burglary.").
42. See id. at 903.
1266 [Vol. 26:4
4
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reasnabl uner te "43reasonable under the circumstances. In some situations, it may be
more reasonable for a person to advance toward or move away
from a danger within that person's home.44 The determination of
the reasonableness of the person's conduct is left to the jury.45
B. Registration of Predatory Offenders
On April 22, 1999, the Minnesota Supreme Court handed
46down its decision in Boutin v. LaFleur. The defendant, Timothy
Boutin, was charged with two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, one count of third-degree assault, and one count
of fifth-degree misdemeanor assault.47 These charges resulted from
an incident with Boutin's girlfriend in November of 1994. 48 At
approximately 2:30 a.m. on November 13, 1994, Boutin was waiting
up for his girlfriend to arrive home after she spent an evening49. ..
out. When his girlfriend arrived, Boutin accused her of engaging
in sexual relations with another man.50 He subsequently pushed
her into a wall, which severely lacerated the back of her head,
necessitating several stitches." Shortly thereafter, Boutin forced
her to have sexual intercourse with him.52 His girlfriend alleged
that he forced her to have sexual intercourse again around 9:00
a.m.53  Boutin later admitted that the two engaged in sexual
intercourse and that "she said she didn't want to and I still did it I
guess.,54
Before trial, Boutin's girlfriend recanted her allegations
regarding the nonconsensual sexual intercourse.5 Boutin then
43. See id. at 904. In a defense of dwelling claim, the jury must determine: (1)
whether the killing was done to prevent the commission of a felony within the
dwelling; (2) whether the defendant's judgment regarding the gravity of the
situation was reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) whether the
defendant's decision to defend his dwelling was a decision that a reasonable
person would have made in light of the danger to be apprehended. See id. (citing
State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. 1999)).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. 591 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1999).
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agreed to plead guilty to the third-degree assault charge. He also
agreed to an upward departure in his sentence from 25 months to
5740 months. Prior to Boutin's release from prison, his case
manager told him he was required to register as a predatory
offender under Minnesota Statute section 243.166. 5' Boutin
registered, and then brought an action against the Commissioner
of Corrections seeking to enjoin the Commissioner from requiring
him to register in the future because the requirement violated his
constitutional rights. 59 The trial court granted the Commissioner's
motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.
60
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Boutin argued
(1) that it was "absurd and unreasonable" to require him to register
as a predatory offender because he was not convicted of a sex
crime; (2) that the Commissioner violated his right to substantive
due process by infringing on his presumption of innocence; and
(3) that the Commissioner violated his right to procedural due
process because he did not have an opportunity to defend against
the charges. 6' The majority affirmed the lower courts, and held
that Boutin was required to register under the predatory offender
62statute.
The majority interpreted the statute by its plain meaning, and
held that even though Boutin was never convicted of one of the
enumerated predatory offenses listed in the statute, he was
convicted of another offense which arose out of the same set of
circumstances as the predatory offenses with which he was
63. 64
charged.63  Therefore, the statute required Boutin's registration.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 713-14.
58. See id. at 714. Minnesota Statute section 243.166, entitled "Registration of
Predatory Offenders," provides in relevant part:
A person shall register under this section if:
(1) the person was charged with or petitioned for a felony violation of or
attempt to violate any of the following, and convicted of or adjudicated
delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the same set
of circumstances; (iii) criminal sexual conduct under section 609.342;
609.343; 609.344; 609.345; or 609.3451, subdivision 3.
MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subd. 1(a) (1998).
59. See Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 714.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 715.
63. See id. at 715-16. The court discussed the history of the predatory
1268 [Vol. 26:4
6
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Regarding Boutin's claim that registration violated his
constitutional right to substantive due process, the court found that
the statute is a civil, regulatory statute and that consequently the
presumption of innocence does not apply. 6' Finally, the court
rejected Boutin's claim that the registration requirement violated
his constitutional right to procedural due process because he did
66not suffer a loss of any recognizable interest. The court
acknowledged that being labeled a predatory offender injures
one's reputation.67 Yet the court refused to recognize a protected
liberty interest in reputation alone.
Three justices dissented.69 The dissent was bothered that the
majority opinion required Boutin to register as a predatory
offender when the district court failed to make a specific finding
that the third-degree assault conviction arose from the same set of
circumstances as the dismissed felony criminal sexual conduct
charges." The dissent did agree, however, that if the district court
offender registration statute noting that "[u]pon its enactment in 1991, this statute
only required that persons convicted of certain enumerated felony offenses
register upon release from prison." Id. at 715. The court further noted that "[i]n
1993 the legislature amended the statute to require that a person register if
convicted of an enumerated felony or 'another offense arising out of the same set of
circumstances.' Id. (emphasis added).
64. See id. at 716.
65. See id. at 717. The court found that the primary purpose of the statute is
to "create an offender registry to assist law enforcement with investigations." Id.
The court further noted:
While conceding that the state has a legitimate interest in registering
predatory offenders, Boutin claims that the state does not have an
interest in registering nonpredatory offenders because the registration of
nonpredatory offenders will dilute the list of predatory offenders and
minimize its law enforcement effectiveness. This argument is not
persuasive. Keeping a list of such offenders is rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of solving crimes. Therefore, we hold that
section 243.166 does not violate Boutin's constitutional right to
substantive due process.
Id. at 718.
66. See id. at 718-19.
67. See id. at 718.
68. See id. at 719.
69. See id. at 721 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Paul H. Anderson wrote
the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Page and Lancaster joined. See id.
70. See id. at 719. In his dissent,Justice Anderson stated:
My review of the record convinces me that the district court did not make
a specific finding either that the criminal sexual conduct with which
2000] 1269
7
Fenlon: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Criminal Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
had made such a finding Boutin would have been required to
register as a predatory offender.7'
C. Search and Seizure
1. Unprovoked Night Can Justify Police Search
In Illinois v. Wardlow,7 the United States Supreme Court held
that unprovoked flight from police can justify investigatory stops by
police. In a 5-4 decision, the court made it clear that police have
broad leeway in patrolling the streets.
On September 9, 1995, the defendant, Wardlow, was standing
in front of a house in a Chicago neighborhood when a four-car
74police caravan passed by the building. The neighborhood was
known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the police were there to
investigate drug activity. 75 As the police caravan passed by the
building, Wardlow saw the caravan and fled.76 Two of the officers
tracked him down and immediately conducted a protective pat-
77down search for weapons. During the search, one officer
Boutin was charged occurred or that the events leading to this charged
offense arose out of the same set of circumstances as the crime of
conviction, third-degree assault. It seems fundamental to me that if the
serious consequences of section 243.166 are to be imposed upon Boutin
or anyone else, we must, at a minimum, require that the district court
make such a specific finding.
Id. at 720.
71. See id. at 721. The dissent stated:
Had the district court made a finding that the criminal sexual conduct
charges arose out of the same set of circumstances as the assault, I have
no doubt that we would not have before us today the issue of whether
Boutin is required to register as a sex offender. With this procedural
safeguard in place, Boutin would undoubtedly have been more fully
aware of the consequences of his guilty plea and we would not be
tempted to make factual findings at this stage of the proceedings. But, as
tempting as it may be to make our own finding based upon police reports
and unverified statements, to do so is improper.
Id.
72. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
73. See id. at 676.
74. See id. at 674-75.
75. See id. at 674.








squeezed Wardlow's bag and felt a gun inside. The officer
opened the bag and found a .38 caliber handgun and five rounds
of live ammunition. 9 The officers then arrested Wardlow.s°
The case reached the Illinois Supreme Court, which
determined that sudden flight in an area known for heavy drug
trafficking did not create a reasonable suspicion to justify the pat-
down search. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the initial stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Relying on Terry v. Ohio,85 the majority
stated that unprovoked flight is the "consummate act of evasion.
The court noted that while flight is "not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, it is certainly suggestive of such."8 5 Stating that police
must use common sense judgments and inferences about human
behavior in determining whether they have reasonable suspicion
for conducting a stop, the Wardlow court held that the officers were
justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal





81. See id. The United States Supreme Court noted that the state courts have
differed on whether unprovoked flight is sufficient grounds to constitute
reasonable suspicion. See id. (citing People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1989)
(holding stop of individual who turned and fled when approached by individual
who resided in immediate area was invalidated); Harris v. State, 423 S.E.2d 723
(Ga. 1992) (holding that merely running away from police may not alone justify
search and seizure); Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1992); (holding that
defendant's driving away quickly after seeing police car justified temporary
investigative stop); People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451 (Mich. 1985) (holding that
even the heightened suspicion of flight by suspect under police surveillance does
not supply the necessary basis to justify even a temporary seizure); State v. Hicks,
488 N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1992) (holding that defendant's efforts to avoid police did
not provide basis for stop of defendant); State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1994)
(holding that running from police did not justify defendant's seizure); State v.
Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990) (holding that the heightened suspicion of
flight by suspect under police surveillance does not supply the necessary basis to
justify even a temporary seizure)).
82. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 n.2.
83. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that
"an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot." Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676.
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2. Determination of When Seizure Occurs
On March 11, 1999, the Minnesota Supreme Court handed
87down its ruling in State v. Harris, which helped refine the precise
point at which a seizure occurs.8 In Harris, two St. Paul narcotics
officers arrested the defendant, Oluseyi Harris, during a drug
interdiction operation at the St. Paul Greyhound Bus Depot.
Harris was a passenger on an interstate bus that made a scheduled
stopover in St. Paul. When the bus made the stopover, Harris got
off the bus and entered the bus depot, acting in a manner that the• • 91
undercover narcotics officers considered suspicious. After Harris
reboarded the bus, the two narcotics officers also boarded. 92 One
of the officers walked to the back of the bus and, while standing in
the middle of the aisle, showed his badge to everyone on board.9
The officer told all passengers that many narcotics were entering
St. Paul from cities outside Minnesota via bus.94 The officer then
informed the passengers that the officers would like to speak with
them individually to determine whether they were transporting any
weapons, narcotics, or large amounts of currency.95 The officer
told the passengers "this is consensual. "96  Both officers were
dressed in plainclothes and, although both were armed, neither
officer displayed his weapon to any of the passengers.97
The officers first approached Harris, who was seated in the
98back row of the bus. One of the officers advised Harris that "this
was all consensual," and asked Harris if he was transporting any
99weapons, narcotics, or large amounts of currency. Harris told the
87. 590 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1999).
88. See id. at 104.
89. See id. at 94.
90. See id. at 95.
91. See id. One of the arresting officers described Harris' and his
companion's behavior saying, "They got off the bus. They kind of looked around
to see who's inside the depot. They didn't use a phone. They didn't get a can of
pop. They wanted to see who was around and they boarded the bus.... [1It
appeared to me that they wanted to see who was inside." Id. The officer further
testified that no other passengers appeared as concerned with the presence of the
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officer he was not.'° The officer then asked Harris' permission to
search his person.' °1 Harris consented, and the officer conducted a
thorough pat-down search.1 2 The officer did not find any weapons,
narcotics or large amounts of currency.)° The officer then asked
whether Harris had any luggage on board. °4 Harris stated that he
had a carry-on-bag in an overhead compartment, and he consented
to the officer's request to search the bag. 05 While searching the
bag, the officer found two baggies, each containing 40-75 plastic
bindles, "which are commonly used to package marijuana for
sale. 10 6  Upon discovering the bindles, the officer confronted
Harris, telling Harris that the officer knew bindles were used to
package narcotics, and demanding that Harris tell him where the
107narcotics were. The officer testified that "[a]t this point, Harris
was extremely nervous, breathing hard, and trying to hide his left
arm."1
0 8
Fearing that Harris might be concealing a gun under his seat,
the officer told Harris that "for officer's safety reasons" he wanted
to see Harris' left arm, which Harris had been trying to hide. 09
When Harris put his left arm on his lap, the officer noticed a large
bulge in the left sleeve of Harris' jacket. 10 When the officer asked
Harris what was in his sleeve, Harris told the officer that he did not
know."' The officer asked Harris if he could check what was in112113
Harris' sleeve."' Harris agreed to the search of his sleeve. The
officer then discovered a large bag of marijuana. 14 The officer
immediately placed Harris under arrest." 5  A brief altercation
ensued in which Harris struck one of the officers in the chest, and
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into custody and charged with fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of
Minnesota Statute section 152.025, subdivisions 1(1) and 3
(1996).117
The district court found Harris guilty as charged. 118 The court
concluded that Harris was not illegally seized because the officers
had reasonable articulable suspicion that Harris might be
transporting controlled substances and because Harris consented
to all of the searches.' 19 The court further concluded that Harris
was not seized until after the officers found the marijuana in his
sleeve. 120 The court of appeals affirmed both the district court's
denial of Harris' motion to suppress and his conviction. Unlike
the district court, the court of appeals held that Harris was seized
when the officers confronted him at his seat at the back of the bus,
rather than when the officers found the marijuana. 122
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Harris argued
that, under the Minnesota Constitution, he was per se seized when
the officers boarded the bus. 12 Alternatively, he argued that he was
seized when the officers confronted him at his bus seat.124 As the
basis for both claims, Harris argued that at neither time did the
officers have reasonable articulable suspicion that Harris was
transporting weapons, narcotics, or large amounts of currency.1
25
He also argued that he did not voluntarily consent to any of the
officers' requests to search his person or his belongings.
126
The majority noted that if Harris was seized at any point before
the officers had reasonable articulate suspicion to seize him, the
evidence gathered thereafter would be suppressed because he
would have been seized illegally.12 However, the court ruled that
the officers did not seize Harris when they boarded the bus and128
announced their intent to search for drugs. Nor did the courtfind that Harris was seized when the officers approached and
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 96-97.




124. See id. at 101.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 102-03.
127. See id. at 104.
128. See id. at 100.
1274 [Vol. 26:4
12
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questioned him at his seat.129 Instead, the court held that it was not
until the officers found the bindles in Harris' bag that Harris was
seized.3  Furthermore, the court held that the officers lacked
reasonable articulable suspicion when they boarded the bus.'' The
court held that the officers did not have a reasonable articulable
suspicion until after they found the bindles in Harris' bag and then
noticed the large bulge in Harris left jacket sleeve, to which Harris
stated that he did not know what the bulge was. 11 At any point
prior to this, Harris could have refused to comply with the officers'
requests to search his person and belongings. However, because
Harris consented to the first search of his person, his constitutional
right to be free from all unreasonable searches and seizures was not
violated.34
Harris argued that the evidence of the marijuana should be
suppressed because he did not voluntarily consent to the second
search of his person, during which the officer found the
marijuana. While the court agreed that Harris did not voluntarily
consent to the second search of his person, the court nevertheless
held that the second search and the resulting seizure of the
marijuana was justified because, as a result of the first consensual
search of his person, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that
Harris was armed and dangerous.
136
129. See id. at 102.
130. See id. at 103-04 (stating that when the officer found the bindles in Harris'
carry-on-bag, "Harris' situation fundamentally changed").
131. Seeid.at1ol.
132. See id. at 104.
133. See id. at 101 ("Had Harris refused to comply with [the officer's] requests,
[the officer] would have been required to terminate the encounter because, at
that point .... [the officer] did not have reasonable articulable suspicion that
Harris was transporting a controlled substance.").
134. See id. at 103.
135. See id. at 104.
136. See id. at 105. The court stated that even though the officers illegally
searched Harris, the evidence of the marijuana would not be suppressed because,
under the "inevitable discovery" exception, the officers would have obtained the
evidence if no misconduct had occurred. See id. The court noted, "had [the
officer] performed a protective outer-clothing pat-down search of Harris' jacket,
he would have felt, then seized, what he had probable cause to believe was
marijuana, which would have been admissible against Harris." Id. The court
further stated that "[b]ecause legal discovery of the marijuana was inevitable, the
intervening illegality of performing a search of Harris' jacket sleeve ... pursuant
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3. Minnesota Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Expectation of
Privacy Beyond that Provided by the United States Constitution
At approximately 8 p.m. on May 15, 1994, an informant
approached an Eagan police officer named Jim Thielen and told
Thielen that he had observed people in an apartment bagging a
white powder.1 3 7  The informant also told Thielen that he/she
thought the occupants of the apartment had a blue Cadillac
currently located in the apartment complex's parking lot.133 In
response, Thielen went to the apartment complex and approached
the window of the apartment unit where he expected the
occupants.' Thielen stood approximately 12-18 inches from the
window and peered through a gap in the window blinds, which
were pulled shut.4 0  For fifteen minutes Thielen observed two
males and one female sitting at the kitchen table packaging, in an
organized manner, a white powdery substance in plastic bags.
1 4 1
Thielen then called Officer Kevin Kallestad of the South Metro
Drug Task Force, and reported what he witnessed. 142 Kallestad
instructed Thielen to stop and secure the Cadillac if anyone tried
to drive it away. 14 Meanwhile, police began to prepare affidavits to
request warrants to search both the apartment and the Cadillac.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., the two men got in the car and began
to drive away. 145 As instructed, Eagan 6police stopped the vehicle
and ordered both men out of the car.14 As the police opened the
door to let the passenger out of the car, they noticed a black
zippered pouch and a handgun, which was later determined to be
loaded.14 7 The police arrested the two men. After receiving the
signed search warrant, the police searched the car and discovered
that the black zippered pouch contained a white mixture in plastic
baggies. 14 9 They also found the passenger's identification, pagers,
137. See State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1999).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 658-59.












William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/13
CRIMINAL LAW
• 150and a scale. Subsequently, the white mixture was identified to be
47.1 grams of cocaine.' The police later returned to the
apartment and arrested its occupant, the woman previously seen152
packaging the white mixture with the two men. The police also
executed a search warrant for the apartment and found cocaine
residue on the kitchen table along with plastic baggies like those
found in the Cadillac.
53
The case reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, which
reversed the district court and the court of appeals, and held that
the police violated the constitutional rights of the defendants.
54
Specifically, the court held that the search of the apartment was
illegal and that the defendants had standing to challenge the
search. 115 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court. 56 The court held that the
defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to
challenge the search of the apartment because the defendants were
short-term business guests, rather than overnight guests who could
claim protection by the Fourth Amendment. On remand by the
United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court
refused to interpret the Minnesota Constitution as providing
broader protection than that offered by the United States
Constitution.58 Consequently, the court held that, under the
Minnesota Constitution, the defendants did not have a legitimate





154. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. 1997) (holding that the
officer's lack of probable cause rendered the search unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 10 of
the Minnesota Constitution), rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
155. See Carter, 596 N.W.2d at 655-56 (noting that three members of the court
dissented, arguing that the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the search of the apartment).
156. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), revg State v. Carter, 569
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1999).
157. See Carter, 596 N.W.2d at 656 (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83
(1998)).
158. See id. (concluding that the defendants' rights to challenge a search
under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution are coextensive with
their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
159. See id. In his dissent, Justice Page stated, "[s]urely their presence in an
apartment with the blinds drawn and the windows and doors closed gave them an
expectation of privacy that was reasonable." Id. at 660 (Page, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, the court affirmed the defendants' convictions.
Steve Fenlon
Justice Page further proclaimed:
If I am incorrect and it is not the illegal nature of the conduct that drives
today's decision, then every Minnesotan has lost their reasonable
expectation of privacy because the limits placed on the reasonableness of
one's expectation of privacy that the court announces today represents
the maximum level of protection that Minnesota citizens can expect.
Minnesota citizens visiting another person's home for whatever purpose
will be surprised to learn that under our law they no longer have an
expectation of privacy in that home. Our citizens deserve more.
Id. at 661.
160. See id. at 658.
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